tions and published engineering standards. Work is ongoing to change existing codes and regulations to reduce compliance costs, but that exercise will have little effect on a court's determination of negligence liability.
Product liability imposes strict liability to everyone normally engaged in selling a product having a "dangerous defect" whenever personal or property injuries are incurred, even when the product was subjected to reasonably foreseeable misuse (9) . Courts have found "dangerous defects" to include inadequate warnings, which could impose product liability for imperceptible hydrogen leaks and flames that cause injuries. A court could also determine hydrogen, which is not odorized in accordance with existing Department of Transportation regulations (10), to have a "dangerous defect," as the Colorado Supreme Court did for unodorized propane (11) .
An abnormally dangerous liability (i.e., a tort where injuries are likely to result even though one exercises "utmost care") occurs for injury-producing activities where there is an "inability to eliminate the risk by exercise of reasonable care" (12) . Some technologies, such as aviation, once considered to be abnormally dangerous, have been transformed to a normally dangerous classification through the passage and enforcement of voluminous regulations. However, it is difficult to imagine how hydrogen use could be assured a normally dangerous classification through the relaxation of the existing eight pages of hydrogen regulations (13), or alternatively, how additional regulations could lead to cost savings. A finding of a normal danger requires additional negligence analysis, while a finding of an abnormal danger imposes strict liability without further analysis. Tort liability is unaffected by legislative or regulatory actions unless the government indemnifies disputes between private parties. When the government previously offered such intervention, it has been for nuclear technologies handled by a limited number of specially trained and licensed professionals (14). However, the purported benefits of the hydrogen economy presume wide-scale deployment to the general public. An economic analysis of liability and associated insurance costs would thus be extremely timely and relevant. 
RUSSELL MOY*

Modeling Marine Protected Areas
WE COMMEND E. SALA ET AL. FOR INCLUDING a socioeconomic factor-density of small fishing boats-in their analysis of marine reserve networks in the Gulf of California ("A general model for designing networks of marine reserves," Reports, 6 Dec., p. 1991). There are, however, some critical omissions in the socioeconomic analysis that should be mentioned if other scientists are contemplating a similar exercise and, more importantly, if policy-makers are considering using such methods to support marine protected area (MPA) design.
First, literature on the political economy of marine reserve creation shows that heavily exploited areas have low opportunity costs and therefore are likely to be accepted by the fishing industry as sites for restricting fishing. This result is seen where fishing is open to all and is due to catch rates in these areas being already depressed. Therefore, the likelihood that the dispersal benefits from the reserve outweigh the opportunity costs of closing off an area to fishing is higher when heavily exploited areas are closed (1) . By ensuring that the most heavily fished areas remain open in their model, the authors are choosing areas for MPAs that decrease, not increase, the potential benefits of marine reserves.
Second, the analysis fails to consider the effects of fishing efforts being redistributed (1, 2) .
Third, there is also no mention of the commercial fishing fleet, tourists, and other types of small-scale fishers in the Gulf of California that make up the human ecology of the region. For example, the area around the Isla de Tiburon qualified as an MPA in part because it has low fishing density. What the analysis fails to take into account is that this area is currently being managed by the Seri Indians, who have legal authority to keep other fishers out and have lived and used these marine resources for hundreds of generations. Because of their stewardship, this area benefits from substantial environmental protection. Surely, Mexican officials would want to understand how these top-down models of reserve creation enable or destroy the social and economic fabric of coastal communities that have independently created management regimes for their coastal waters.
Fourth, the authors state that "[t]he most important benefit of this approach is the objectivity it provides to the process of siting marine reserves." This is misleading. Once the relative weights are placed on each component, the objectivity comes from the algorithm choosing the closed areas based on the set of variables and decision criteria. However, the choice of variables and the weights given to them are completely subjective. We believe that the authors had the former in mind when making this statement, but the latter should not be dismissed, especially in the political economy of fishery policy.
In summary, we emphasize that although analysis intended to aid MPA siting decisions can never be objective, researchers should strive to better represent the complex ecological, sociocultural, and economic dimensions by including variables that are sufficient to capture the range of human activity in their study region.
JAMES N. SANCHIRICO, 1 * RICHARD STOFFLE, 2 KENNY BROAD, 3 LIANA TALAUE-MCMANUS 3 Response AS SANCHIRICO ET AL. ARE NO DOUBT AWARE, the U.S. National Research Council (NRC) recently released a report on marine protected areas (MPAs) and their role as an important tool for ocean governance and management (1) . While stressing the importance of stakeholder buy-in or acceptance, this report emphasized that reserves are needed to protect biological resources rather than economic systems. Because one of us (P.K.D.) was an author of the NRC report (as was one of the Letter authors, R. Stoffle), our paper carefully followed the first recommendation of the NRC report: "The design of MPAs should proceed through four stages: (1) evaluate needs, (2) set goals, (3) assemble data on the region to be served by the MPAs, and (4) outline various options for siting areas that meet the previously agreed-on goals" (1, p. 176). The NRC report also suggests that the first objective of MPAs is "to protect biodiversity. In the design of a system of marine reserves and protected areas, the complete spectrum of habitats supporting marine biodiversity should be included with emphasis on safeguarding ecosystem processes" (1, p.177).
Although we share the concerns of Sanchirico et al., we believe we have been faithful to the objectives of the NRC report to L E T T E R S on July 16, 2008 www.sciencemag.org
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first protect marine biodiversity with sensitivity to local economic concerns. If society were forced to await the satisfaction of all economic interests before protecting their resources, it is unlikely that much protection would ever occur, and thus the resources supporting the economic concerns would continue their collapse.
Sanchirico et al. misunderstand our position that this was a general model, not a final solution, and that it is based on a compromise between ecological safeguards and economic considerations. We used the density of small fishing boats as an example of how socioeconomic factors can be incorporated from the beginning of a reserve planning process, rather than post hoc, to reduce social conflict. We also explicitly stated that future models need to account for "additional social factors, including future threats." These additional factors include those outlined by Sanchirico et al. We aimed at reducing social conflict by reducing the overlap between high fishing pressure and the location of marine reserves, but, as we wrote in our Report, "having reserves near fisheries can be beneficial to fishing." Because some of us have been working in marine conservation in the Gulf of California for a long time, we understand that different models can be applied under different objectives and cultures. As Sanchirico et al. must be aware, the political economy of marine reserves is based on local cultures, which implies that solutions that work in one area might not work in the next. Moreover, if an area identified as a conservation priority already has good management, this would not only reduce the need for additional management, but also reinforce the adequacy of local management regimes.
We welcome other models that offer the same degree of ecological protection and improved economic futures.
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